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1. BURTON-ROBERTS' CONTENTIONS
In his paper 'On Horn's dilemma: presupposition and negation' Burton-
Roberts (1989 a) presents an ambitious programme, formulated right at the
outset. He seeks to establish three points:
(i) Under the 'standard logical definition of presupposition' a pre-
suppositional semantics is INCOMPATIBLE with a SEMANTICALLY
AMBIGUOUS NEGATION operator (SAN), on pain of the theory being
rendered 'empirically empty and theoretically trivial'.
(ii) From this it follows that the one unambiguous negation is
presupposition preserving. Cases that have been identified as
presupposition-cancelling negation should be re-analysed as
'instances of a pragmatic phenomenon', not unlike what has been
proposed in Horn (1985), that is as METALINGUISTIC NEGATION (MN).
(iii) This pragmatic analysis of MN 'itself implies a presuppositional
semantics', that is to say 'a presuppositional theory of truth-value
gaps'.
To those familiar with presupposition theory in its various present-day
guises this programme will seem ambitious. Contention (i) goes against the
mainstream of current opinion, where it is held that, given the available facts,
negation must be taken to be ambiguous if presupposition is taken to be a
logico-semantic relation. Burton-Roberts proclaims this to be a mistaken
notion, thereby taking on a heavy burden of proof. Contention (ii) is also
surprising, as it denies ambiguity to negation while at the same time a
presupposition-cancelling and non-truth-functional but pragmatic meta-
linguistic negation is distinguished from a presupposition-preserving truth-
functional semantic negation. The same goes for contention (iii), according
to which the promised pragmatic analysis is said to imply a presuppositional
semantics. We shall have a look at these three contentions first, whereby the
strictly logical aspects will be taken together, to be followed by the pragmatic
claims. We will then consider some facts, largely taken from Seuren (1985),
not brought to bear by Burton-Roberts, yet clearly relevant and disturbing.
[1] I am grateful to the editor of JL and two anonymous reviewers, whose comments have
helped me considerably in sharpening my arguments and finding the right tone.
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A constant theme in the critique will be Burton-Roberts' unwarranted
attempts at pre-empting empirical issues on invalid a priori grounds.
2. ' P R E S U P P O S I T I O N A L SEMANTICS REQUIRES ONE UNIQUE AND
MINIMAL N E G A T I O N '
Burton-Roberts begins by characterizing what a presuppositional semantics
amounts to. It is based on a 'logical definition of presupposition', which, for
the purposes of his argument,2 can be given as follows:
(i) A PRESUPPOSES B iff A entails B and Not-A entails B.
This, Burton-Roberts then asserts, has the consequences that:
' (i) A and Not-A share their presuppositions, and (ii) where A presupposes
B, presupposition-failure (in the form of the non-truth of B) results
inevitably in A's having a third logical status other than true or false.
Indeed, the definition in (i) is equivalent to that in (2) and to that in (3):
(2) A presupposes B iff Not-A presupposes B.
(3) A presupposes B iff B is true in every state of affairs in which A is true,
and A has a third logical status (other than true or false) when B is not
true.'
From the point of view of (propositional) logic, these claims do not seem to
be warranted. He fails to specify in what kind of logic the 'consequences' (i)
and, especially, (ii) are supposed to hold. If the logic is strictly bivalent, i.e.
classical, (ii) does not hold. All that follows then is that any presupposed B
is a logically necessary truth, since, by contraposition, Not-B would lead to
the contradiction ' A and Not-A' and is therefore impossible. BR's (ii) does
follow when (1) is extended with the clause: 'and B is not a logically
necessary truth'. So let us do that. The consequence is a non-bivalent, i.e.
non-classical, logical system.
But even then one cannot say that (1) is equivalent to (2) and (3). The
alleged equivalence of (1) and (2) is difficult to see: (1) defines presupposition
in terms of entailment, whereas (2) defines the notions 'presupposition of A'
and ' presupposition of Not-A' in terms of each other. How these can be
called equivalent is unclear, though it is not difficult to construct a logical
system and define negation in it in such a way that (2) will FOLLOW FROM ( I ) .
[2] Burton-Roberts' own definition of presupposition is presented in Burton-Roberts (1989b).
The definition given there must, unfortunately, be characterized as logically incoherent, or
anyway as making it impossible for any sentence to have contingent presuppositions (see
Seuren (to appear b)). This is, however, not at issue here. We shall act as though he accepts
the definitions as given here, not only, as he says, 'for the purpose of the argument', but
also because it transpires (see below at the end of section 2) that he actually adheres to
them, in spite of what he defends in (1989 b).
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But let us forget about (2), and concentrate for a moment on (3).3 We will
then see that (1) and (3) are by no means equivalent. The demonstration of
this non-equivalence will prove useful for an adequate insight into the
questions at hand.4
Let us make an inventory of all possible combinations of the values TRUE
(T), FALSE (F), and whatever the now no longer excluded THIRD (3) might
amount to for the sentences A, B, and Not-A. In doing that I shall make use
of Van Fraassen's (1971) system of presentation by means of VALUATIONS, i.e.
truth-value assignments to all sentences considered. Each valuation
represents a state of affairs as defined by the truth-values assigned to the
sentences in question. For the sentences A, B, an Not-A the following
complete set of valuations can be constructed:
(4) Non-bivalent field of valuations ^ for A, B, and Not-A





































































































The valuations are numbered from 1 to 27. All possible 33 combinations of
T, F and 3 for the three sentences A, B, and Not-A are thus given.
The question is now: what does 3 represent? Burton-Roberts is rather
vague on this. On pp. 96-7 he informs the reader that he will follow
Quine (i960: 177). This, unfortunately, is a passage where the American
philosopher, though no mean figure, manifests considerable confusion:
Even such truth-value gaps can be admitted and coped with, perhaps best
by something like a logic of three truth values. But they remain an irksome
complication, as complications are that promise no gain in understanding.
[3] Note that the formulation in (3): 'B is true in every state of affairs in which A is true' is
by definition equivalent to 'A entails B' or At=B. Definition (3) thus says that A
presupposes B iff A t= B and non-truth of B results in 'a third logical status' for A.
[4] Some readers may find the following pages hard to read. To those I apologise, but I hope
they realize that logical theory, like mathematical theory, has no choice but to be formal.
Other readers, more versed in logic, might be surprised at the unfamiliar character of some
of the notions presented. These I simply ask to concentrate on the logical and mathematical
correctness of the analysis. They will see that, in the end, standard classical logic has not
suffered at all, but has perhaps rather been enriched by these innovations.
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Quine had obviously not investigated the metalogical question of gaps and
further truth-values with anything like the rigour he has shown elsewhere
(but then, Quine was never much in favour of what he perceived as
unorthodoxy). In any case, Burton-Roberts does seem to follow Quine in
being unclear about the issue. Having first (97) left the issue more or less
open, he decides later on (106) definitely in favour of interpreting ' 3 ' as a
gap. Meanwhile (104) he refers to Dummett (1973), who argues, on good
grounds, that what Frege (and Strawson) took to be a truth-value gap had
better be reinterpreted as a third value. Burton-Roberts' disappointing
comment is that 'in these terms, the distinction between a presuppositional
and a non-presuppositional logic reduces to a merely terminological one'.
We are not much helped by what we read on p. 105, where he makes further
comments on multivalued systems:
They are purely formal systems. They are not specifically intended to
reconstruct the intuitive notion of the radical kind of failure constituted by
the failure to make a statement, a failure induced by presupposition-
failure.
Surely, there is nothing against a 'purely formal system' which is 'specifically
intended to reconstruct' some intuitive notion. What else do we do in
science? Moreover, a trivalent logic would be intended to reconstruct the
intuitive notion of a radically false statement, which can be rendered true
only by denying a presupposition, whereas a bivalent logic with gaps would
be intended to reconstruct the intuitive notion of 'failure to make a
statement'. The two kinds of reconstruction are, as is easily seen, rather
different from one another. It is indeed surprising, then, to read on p. 106
that the appeal to a bivalent logic with gaps 'is made as a means of
reconstructing the intuition of a very radical kind of failure, the failure to
make an assertion that has a truth-value. I am calling this "statement
failure".' Should one conclude from this that Burton-Roberts denies to a
trivalent logic the power of reconstruction of an intuitive notion which he
grants to a bivalent logic with gaps? I think his position on these matters is
highly puzzling.5
There is, of course, a fundamental distinction between accepting truth-
value gaps on the one hand, and a third truth-value on the other. The
difference is that gaps fall outside the system of truth-functions, whereas a
third value takes part in them. A truth-function, such as logical negation,
maps truth-values onto truth-values, for example, T onto F and F onto T, for
[5] This impression is reinforced by statements like: 'Dummett, Evans and I do seem to be
agreed, however, on the existence of a correlation between an enlargement of the set of
falsity/negation operators in a logic and the interpretation of that logic as being strictly
multivalent, as having an enlarged set of actual truth-values as such' (105). Burton-Roberts
seems to be presenting here what is necessary by definition as though it were a matter of
opinion.
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classical negation. But it does not accept a non-truth-value as input: if 3 is
regarded as a gap, then a truth-function rejects it as input, and consequently
gives no output, as Burton-Roberts himself points out on p. 97. For negation
this is usually expressed by saying that if A has no value (i.e. figures as 3),
then Not-A likewise lacks a value (and figures as 3). The straightforward
table for classical negation in a system with two truth-values and gaps (one
often speaks of a ' bivalent system with gaps') is thus:









If, however, 3 is interpreted as a truth-value along with T and F, we have
a truly three-valued (trivalent) system. In such a system there is no necessity
to let a 3 input result in a 3 output, since other possibilities are now
available.
In a truly trivalent system, all values other than T are different kinds of
falsity, that will occur under different kinds of violation of truth-conditions.
In such a system a negation operator can be defined in a variety of ways,
whereby we require that the operator be truth-functional, that it does not
map T onto T, and that at least one value other than T be mapped onto T,
these being considered constitutive properties of whatever deserves the name
of negation. Under these conditions, a logic with three truth-values (and no
gaps) allows for no less than 10 distinct negation operators, as is shown in
(6):













































It is not too difficult to prove (Weijters, 1985; Seuren, 1988) that classical
bivalent logic defined over the truth-functional operators -> (classical
negation), A (conjunction) and/or V (disjunction) is the minimal case of an
infinite set S£ of possible ^-valued logics all defined over these same operators
in such a way that -> turns T into F and all other values into T, A selects the
highest and V the lowest value of the pair or arguments. In other words, the
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number of values in a logical system is irrelevant as long as the operators over
which it is defined are as described above. Of the ten negations in (6), clearly,
N3 is the classical negation -i. It will be clear that, in a system denned over
just (-1, A, v) , there is little point in extending the number of truth-values
beyond the minimum of 2, since any further values are logically vacuous.
Clearly, a three-valued logic with ten negations is not of much use, certainly
not for the description of the logical properties of natural language sentences.
There is, however, a simple and elegant way of constraining the number of
negations so that an w-valued system will have, besides the classical negation
-i, n-i SPECIFIC negations. This is done in the following way.
Every ^-valued logic ^neJ5? has a hierarchy of specific negations
negj... negn_j such that for every sentence p of the language L the universe
°U of possible valuations ('worlds') contains a hierarchy of subuniverses
%{p\,..., <^(/>)n-i with the following properties: (i) °ll{p)n.x = °U, (ii) each
', £ < (^/Oi+i ( i < i < n - i ) , (iii) neg, denotes ('expresses')
)1 — /p/C/p/' stands for the set of valuations or 'worlds' in which p has
the value T), and (iv) each subsequent neg, (i < i ^ n — i ) denotes
<W(p)i — '%(p)i_v Logics with more than two values and with the negations as
here specified can be called PRESUPPOSITIONAL LOGICS. Thus, given a three-
valued presuppositional logic # 3 and a sentence a, the universe °ll will be
stuctured, for a, as in Figure i.
Figure i. The structuring o f * for sentence a in a trivalent presuppositional calculus
Presuppositional logics have the property that the disjunction of all their
specific negations is equivalent to the classical negation. Thus, for a, neg^a)
V neg2(a) = -< a. A little ciphering will show that for a trivalent pre-
suppositional logic negj is N4 of (6) above, and neg2 is N2 of (6).6 negx is the
[6] For a detailed discussion of these matters see Seuren (1988). Note that the similarity of the
table for neg: ( = N4 of (6)) with the table given for -1 in (5) is deceptive: in (5) 3 stands
for a gap in a bivalent system, and can be read as: 'neither true nor false', whereas in (6)
it stands for a further falsity value and can be read as 'neither true nor minimally false'.
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MINIMAL NEGATION (~) , which turns MINIMAL FALSITY into truth and
preserves presuppositions, and neg2 is the RADICAL NEGATION (=:), turning
RADICAL FALSITY into truth and cancelling presuppositions, as described in
Seuren (1984), (1985), (1988). We can now say that a trivalent pre-
suppositional calculus has the minimal and the radical negations as its
SPECIFIC NEGATIONS. Their disjunction equals classical negation. The other
negation operators listed in (6) have no function in a trivalent pre-
suppositional calculus.
This illustrates the difference between a logic with gaps and a logic with
three (or more) values. Let us now revert to (4). We can now see that many
of the projected valuations of (4) will become INADMISSIBLE (in Van
Fraassen's (1971) terms) if not is defined as a negation. Which valuations will
become inadmissible will depend on whether we interpret 3 as a gap or as the
third value, and, if the latter, which of the available negations we choose as
a logical rendering for not.
If 3 in (4) is regarded as a truth-value gap there is only one possible
negation, the classical negation as given in (5). Under that truth-function, the
set of valuations in (4) that are not ruled out (declared 'inadmissible') is
{2,5,8,10,13,16,21,24,27}, as is easily checked. The same holds for the
interpretation of 3 as the third value, and of not as the minimal negation (~) .
Let us express this by saying that
* ( ~ ) = n-gJ = {2,5,8,10,13,16,21,24,27}.
Analogously, if 3 is taken to be the third value and not is translated as the
radical negation (~) , then:
^ ( - ) = {3,6,9,10,11,13,14,16,17}
and again, if 3 is a real truth-value and not is the classical negation (-.), then:
<&(-.) = {2,3,5,6,8,9,10,13,16}
Now we can come to the point. If presupposition is defined as some sort of
entailment relation, as in (1) or (3) above, then, if A presupposes B (A > B),
further restrictions on the respective < '^s are required. What restrictions will
be required will depend on three decisions: whether we interpret 3 as a gap
or as the third value; whether we take definition (1) or definition (3); and, if
the former, whether we take ~ , ^ , or -i as the logical rendering of not. We
will then see that the results will differ for almost each choice we make. Only
for some specific choices will the results be the same. Let us look at this in
detail.
If we take (3) as the definition of the presupposition relation, and we read
Burton-Roberts as intending that 'B is not true' should be taken to mean
that B has either the value F or the value 3 (or, for that matter, falls into the
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truth-value gap), then, if not is the minimal negation, one will easily see that
^ ( ~ ) is further restricted to {2,10,21,24,27}, or:
* ( ~ ) A » B < 3 ) = {2.10,21,24,27}.
Likewise:
and:
* ( - ) A > B , S ) = {2,3,6,9,10}.
But under definition (1), according to which 'A P B' requires that 'A t=B
and Afo/-AI=B', the results are different, at least for the radical and
the classical negation - unless we interpret 3 as a truth-value gap and not
as the third value, because in that case t ( ~ ) J > B ( 3 ) = t ( ~ ) A > ] ) | 1 ) =
^(n gap)A p B(1). The results of ^-restriction under definition (1) and under
the various negations allowed for by a truly trivalent calculus (or under the
one negation allowed for in a system with gaps) are as follows:
)A > Bu> = *( -gap) A > ecu = {2,10,21,24,27}
*(=0A>B<1) = ft.").". 14,17}
« W A > B U , = {2,3.10}
The different admissibility conditions for valuations under the definitions
(3) and (1), respectively, show that definition (1) is NOT equivalent to
definition (3), and that it makes a great deal of difference whether we regard
the 'third logical status' as a gap or as a real truth-value. Burton-Roberts'
contentions that under 'the standard logical definition of presupposition'
negation must be unambiguous and presupposition-preserving, and that
definition (1) is equivalent to definition (3) are tenable only on the
assumption that we have a two-valued system with gaps. This means that he
in fact adopts the old Frege-Strawson analysis of presuppositions, which
assumes precisely such a logic, a fact which he does not deny. On the
contrary, he makes it quite clear that he does work with the Strawsonian
notion of presupposition. But what makes his argument so strange is that he
presents this position as in some way an a priori necessity, whereas, in fact,
there is quite a choice of alternatives.7 What the best alternative is will
[7] Cf. for example this passage on p. 106: 'In Section 2 I addressed some general
considerations of principle which suggest that it is not open to the proponent of
presuppositionally induced truth-value gaps to appeal to a further (external, 'pre-
supposition-cancelling') negation. Negation must be unambiguously 'presupposition-
preserving'. First, the impossibility of more than one negation in a bivalent system with
gaps is not something to be 'suggested' but a mathematical necessity of such systems, as
has been shown above (cf. note 4). Then, the second sentence, which claims that negation
must be unambiguous and minimal, stands in no relation to the first since there is no a
priori or, for that matter, empirical, necessity requiring a bivalent logic with gaps.
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depend crucially on the empirical adequacy of the descriptions and analyses
presented in terms of it.
The empirical factor is not entirely forgotten by Burton-Roberts, but he
tries to pre-empt the empirical issue by bringing to bear what look like a
priori arguments. While theoretically leaving room for a truly trivalent
system with two negations, he maintains that one can rule this out, again, on
a priori grounds, because such a system is possible only at the cost of
'rendering the theory empirically empty and theoretically trivial' (95). And
this is so, he claims, because given the two negations that would figure in such
a logic the denotation of the one (the ' internal' negation) is included in the
denotation of the other (the 'external' negation): 'The more specific internal
understanding entails the more general external understanding; for a
semantics that includes the external operator, it is impossible to demonstrate
that it also includes a distinct internal operator' (100). The point is reiterated
on p. 102:
A logical theory of presupposition (denned as in (1) above) which includes
a presupposition-cancelling negation is trivial and empirically empty
because it is quite simply unfalsifiable. No putative counter-example to the
original definition could possibly be a counter-example since they are
wiped out at a stroke by this 'presupposition-cancelling' negation. This
theory would effectively be a theory capable of handling its own proper
counter-examples.
His conclusion is anyway that it is useless even to try to establish SAN
because that alleged ambiguity is of a kind which, on a priori grounds, cannot
be established.
Unfortunately, however, Burton-Roberts overlooks some of his own
presuppositions. The first is that if SAN is proposed it must be an ambiguity
between classical ('external') and minimal ('internal') negation. We have just
seen, however, that it may well make more sense to distinguish between
radical and minimal negation, in which case there is no entailment relation
either way between the two. Furthermore, there is the assumption that if
negation is in some way ambiguous, then ALL POSSIBLE USES OF NEGATION
ARE THAT WAY AMBIGUOUS. This assumption, let us call it the ACROSS-THE-
BOARD ASSUMPTION of natural language negation, is a necessary requirement
for his conclusion. Yet there is nothing in the available data that suggests
that this assumption is correct. It is in fact, as I shall argue below, incorrect:
there are pairs of positive and negative sentences where the negation
necessarily preserves the presuppositions, and there are pairs of such
sentences where the negation pointedly fails to do so. The difference depends
on grammatical, lexical and idiomatic features of the sentence. My conclusion
is, therefore, quite the opposite of Burton-Roberts: the ambiguity of not as
intended here is not only falsifiably ascertainable, it is also really there.
It is generally not very clear what operational criteria will help us to
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distinguish, in any systematic way, vagueness from ambiguity. The literature
contains some suggestions that do not work too badly to distinguish
ordinary cases of lexical or syntactic ambiguity from vagueness. One
generally accepted criterion for ambiguity is provided by Quine's famous
passage (i960: 129):
Ambiguity differs from vagueness. Vague terms are only dubiously
applicable to marginal objects, but an ambiguous term such as 'light' may
be at once clearly true of various objects (such as dark feathers) and clearly
false of them.
Another test to distinguish ambiguity from vagueness, much in use among
linguists, was provided by Lakoff (1970). It is based on so do-pro-
nominalisation of a preceding sentence A. If A is ambiguous the so do-
pronominalisation continues the reading selected for A. In cases of vagueness
there is no such continuation. For example, if the first conjunct in (7 a), which
is clearly ambiguous, is taken in one reading, then the second conjunct carries
on on that same reading. But the first conjunct in (7 b) is vague, not
ambiguous, as between for example whether the left or the right foot was
used. Now, because this is vagueness and not ambiguity, the second conjunct
is not restricted to the leg that may have been in the speaker's mind in the
first conjunct:
(7) (a) Selma likes visiting relatives and so does Sam.
(b) Harry kicked Sam and so did Dave.
Other criteria for the distinction between ambiguity and vagueness are not
too hard to find. For example, if a sentence A entails B in one context but
fails to entail B in a different context, without the context containing material
necessitating B, then A is ambiguous and not just vague. This follows from
the fact that a difference in entailments implies a difference in truth-
conditions and hence a difference in meaning. Let us call this the ENTAILMENT
CRITERION. We shall use it in a moment.
In any case, under these criteria Burton-Roberts' claim that it is impossible
to demonstrate two readings if one entails the other is too strong. This
appears, for example, with sentences containing the conjunction operator
and, as has been observed by Horn (1985: 127). Such sentences are often
ambiguous between a cumulative and a reciprocal reading, as is shown by:
(8) Sue and Dave are married.
Although the reciprocal reading entails the cumulative one, the two readings
are clearly distinct and can be seen to be so under Quine's and Lakoffs
criteria. Under Quine's criterion the ambiguity appears, for example, if (8) is
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placed in a context where it is false on the reciprocal but true on the
cumulative reading, as in:
(9) A: Why are Sue and Dave so often together? Are they married?
B: No, Sue and Dave are not married. They are both deceiving
their spouses.
If there were not some ambiguity in B's first sentence, which is the negation
of (8), B's reply would be incoherent, since his second sentence implies that
they are married, LakofTs test yields the same result:
(10) Sue and Dave are married, and so are Harry and Jim.
On the reciprocal reading of the first conjunct this sentence will cause some
puzzlement precisely because the second conjunct continues this reading. But
on the cumulative reading everything is as it should be. So there can be little
doubt that, under these two criteria, (8) is ambiguous, and not vague, even
though the one reading entails the other.8 Another, ad hoc, indication of
ambiguity here is the fact that:
(11) Both Sue and Dave are married.
only has the cumulative meaning. Clearly, the cumulative sense allows for the
addition of both, but the reciprocal sense does not. It will be clear, anyway,
that a claim of ambiguity does not imply a claim that the two postulated
readings or senses are logically or semantically unrelated to each other.
However, as regards the possible ambiguity of not, the question of whether
one reading entails the other need not even be relevant, since, as was pointed
out earlier, it is not clear that minimally negated sentences entail their
counterparts under the negation that cancels presuppositions. Burton-
Roberts proceeds on the assumption that the ('external') negation operator
that he presents as the presupposition-cancelling one in a trivalent logic is the
classical negation (--), not the radical negation. On p. 99 he gives the table for
this alleged presupposition-denying negation, and this table is identical to
that of N3 in (6) above, in other words, classical negation. But we have seen
that the two specific negations of a trivalent presuppositional calculus are the
minimal negation ( = N4 of (6) above) and the radical negation (= N2 in
(6)). Now, minimally negated sentences do NOT entail radically negated
sentences. They entail classically negated sentences because, as we have seen,
~ A v ~ A = -iA. But Burton-Roberts fails to mention even the possibility
of the radical negation operator, though, having consulted Seuren (1984) and
(1985), he must have been aware of it.
[8] Zwicky and Sadock (1975), while allowing for possible ambiguity between two readings
one of which entails the other ('privative opposites'), observe that such ambiguities will
sometimes be hard to establish under the standard tests. This does not seem to apply to the
ambiguity of (8).
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The question is again, therefore, a purely empirical one. And if not turns
out to be best described as being ambiguous between a minimal and a radical
(or at any rate presupposition-cancelling) reading, the logical space required
for such an ambiguity is available. Unfortunately, however, Quine's and
Lakoff s criteria are not easy to apply (cf. note 8). It is difficult to conjure up
a situation where a sentence Not-A. is 'at once clearly true' on one reading
and 'clearly false' on the other. In the eyes of most researchers, this test is
indecisive, which does not mean, of course, that there is no ambiguity, only
that this test does not show it up if it is there. Lakoff s test fares a little better
(at least in my view, not in the view of Kempson (1975: 100), whose
examples, however, are too longwinded and involved to carry weight as
evidence for speakers' intuitions). Consider the following sentence:
(12) Jack has not come back and neither has Wilma.
The predicate come back induces the presupposition that the subject has been
or is away. It would seem that (12) can be followed coherently by either:
They are both still away (in which case both conjuncts preserve the
presupposition) or by: Because neither of them ever left. But a continuation
like: Jack is still away and/but Wilma never left, which requires an
interpretation where the first conjunct preserves the presupposition but the
second does not, seems odd. Yet it is clear that this is not the kind of hard
empirical evidence required for a serious claim that natural language not is
ambiguous. The evidence for that claim comes from other sources.
Burton-Roberts refers to some of the relevant literature on the subject of
the ambiguity of negation. Other publications can be mentioned as well. The
overall impression one gets is clearly that the ambiguity tests currently in use
fail to deliver an unambiguous result. Martin (1982), for example, argues
extensively that the available tests, when applied to the available material,
are indecisive for not (see also Seuren, 1985: 260-266). Gazdar's argument
from translation (1979: 65) (if no? were ambiguous why is it that no language
seems to disambiguate between the two readings?) is widely considered to be
a tough one for proponents of SAN. Yet it is not decisive. First, if not is
indeed ambiguous between the readings that are at issue here, this is not an
ordinary common or garden ambiguity, and we have no theory yet of such
special cases of ambiguity. Then, we have just established the ambiguity of
sentences like (8) above, and here, too, languages tend not to disambiguate.
Moreover, even lexical ambiguities can be systematic and productive, and
not language-particular. The verb work, for example, can mean ' be at one's
paid job ' or simply 'exert oneself in a constructive way', as in Rommetveit's
(1983) example John is working, which is true on one reading but false on the
other when John is busy in his garden on Saturday morning. Or take my
answer No when I'm taking a snack in a roadside restaurant and have just
been asked Are you a driver! I am, of course, a driver in one sense since my
car is parked outside, but I am not a driver in the special sense intended,
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namely a professional lorry or bus driver. Such cases satisfy the standard
ambiguity tests. There is really no known good reason to suppose that not
should be somehow excluded from such semantic processes. Therefore, the
'argument from translation' is more rhetorical than logical. In other words,
in the light of the evidence considered by Burton-Roberts one must conclude
that the issue of SAN is wide open, and his unsuccessful attempt at pre-
empting the issue on a priori grounds does not seem to add much to the
debate.
Burton-Roberts has so far failed to establish anything that was not already
generally known. But he defends (or adopts, for the sake of his argument -
see note i above) a view which is now considered to have been refuted. In
particular, he adopts the Strawsonian view of presupposition, expressed in
definition (i) and embedded in a two-valued logic with gaps. Consequently,
his negation is as in (5), and thus presupposition-preserving. He has tried,
without success, to impose this (aspect of his) view as somehow required by
inherent properties of logico-semantic systems, in the face of available
evidence. There is clear evidence, which has been accepted by the relevant
scientific community for the past fifteen years, showing that in many cases
natural language not does not preserve presuppositions as entailments (the
cases where it does (see below) had not been observed and were thus
unknown). Examples abound, for instance, in Wilson (1975), and they are
all of the type:
(13) (a) The king of France is NOT bald. There is no king of France.
(b) Donald has NOT forgotten that we have a meeting. We don't
have a meeting.
(c) Kate has NOT stopped smoking. She has never smoked in her
life.
It was then assumed that this presupposition-cancelling ability of not, though
only in contextually and intonationally heavily marked uses, was a general
property of all uses of not, in other words the Across-the-Board Assumption
mentioned above. Given this assumption, observations like those in (13) were
taken by the majority of researchers as evidence of the untenability of the
Strawsonian, and Burton-Roberts', position on presupposition, and with
good reason. For if Not-A never by itself ENTAILS the presuppositions of A,
then what are called presuppositions are, logically speaking, simply
entailments, and there is thus no reason for tinkering with standard strictly
bivalent logic, with just two truth-values and no gaps. We remember that the
reason for introducing gaps was precisely the claim that both A and Not-A
entail B if A presupposes B, while B is not a logically necessary truth.
If now Not-A is seen NOT to entail B in the cases of alleged presupposition,
the bottom falls out of the whole notion of presupposition as a logico-
semantic relation. Hence the title of Boer & Lycan's well-known (1976)
paper: 'The myth of semantic presupposition'. If presupposition is anything
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at all, it is not logico-semantic, was the general conclusion. The feeling was
that it would be something pragmatic. This analysis is often called the
ENTAILMENT ANALYSIS of presupposition, since it treats presuppositions, from
a logico-semantic point of view, as just entailments. The Strawsonian
position is thus seen to be untenable, since the only possible negation there
preserves the presuppositions of the argument clauses. If one insists that
presuppositions should be regarded as a logico-semantic relation, then what
is needed is a truly trivalent logic with two distinct negations, namely with
SAN. But this, it was said, is logically unnecessary, since classical logic will
do the job. If one is unconvinced by possible contrary evidence based on
ambiguity tests of the kind discussed above, and if one, moreover, accepts the
Across-the-Board Assumption of natural language negation, there seems to
be no fault with this reasoning.
But Burton-Roberts does find fault with it, though he is unconvinced by
possible contrary evidence and accepts the Across-the-Board Assumption.
He rightly treats cases like (i3a-c) as 'special' or 'marked' (he is even (98,
100) prepared to call them unnatural), yet he accepts them as possible.
However, they 'are to be treated non-semantically, as instances of a
pragmatic phenomenon' (95). This view is not new. It has been defended by
a variety of authors, such as, for example, Atlas (1979) or Horn (1985). But
none of these proposes that the logico-semantic negation should be the
Strawsonian one, namely (5). If a commitment is made (Atlas (1979), for
example, refrains from making one), it is to the classical negation in a
bivalent logic without gaps, that is to a cancelling negation, and not to a
presupposition-preserving negation. The general view (based on the Across-
the-Board Assumption) is that presuppositions are SUGGESTED, but not
ENTAILED, in negative sentences. And since logic is nothing to do with
suggestions, this property must be kept out of the logic. Pragmatics seems an
obvious haven. And the logic can stay the way it has always been: classical.
Burton-Roberts agrees with this, except on the point of the logic staying
classical. He proposes that Not-A always entails the presuppositions of A,
except in pragmatically strongly marked cases like those of (13) above,
thereby placing a heavy burden on pragmatics. For while it is common, when
appeals are made to pragmatics, to expect pragmatic theory to account for
all kinds of suggestions (implicatures), ADDITIONAL to the hard logico-
semantic entailments of sentence types, one rarely sees that pragmatic theory
is expected to CANCEL hard entailments at type level.9
Burton-Roberts proceeds in the following way. He begins by proposing
[9] Note that we are dealing here with TYPES, that is with sentences as linguistic objects
regardless of context, not TOKENS, or sentences uttered in specific contexts, even though the
type level properties at issue may concern CONDITIONS for felicitous use in any context
given. I do not contest, of course, that in certain contexts, e.g. when a sentence is uttered
non-literally (in particular metaphorically), ironically, in quotation or other similar uses,
the entailments carried by the sentence may become inoperative.
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that the marked character of presupposition-cancelling cases like those in
(13), cases, that is, with a so-called 'echo', is in itself an argument for keeping
them out of the logico-semantic system. This argument is found on p. 100:
It seems too descriptively implausible to suggest that an operation for
which specific provision is made within the semantics should result in any
feeling of specialness, markedness or unnaturalness when actually applied.
On the contrary, the effect of incorporating such an operator within the
semantics would be precisely to normalize that sense of negation. But this
contradicts much of what a semantics of presupposition is supposed to
account for.
I find this argument hard to follow. It takes for granted that 'marked'
phenomena (in some reasonable notion of markedness, - and I will not deny
that presupposition-cancelling negation comes into this category) per se fall
outside the domain of a logico-semantic analysis of natural language
sentences. The wider context of this passage makes it clear that Burton-
Roberts follows common practice in more or less equating semantics with
logic, opposing both to pragmatics. Logico-semantic analysis is thus
supposed to 'normalize' the objects analysed, excluding marked cases.
Clearly, the notion of markedness employed here is not any of the notions
current in phonology or other areas of linguistics, where 'marked' cases are
not considered in any way ' abnormal', and hence not falling under the terms
of the analysis.
It is true that logic is standardly regarded as being about entailment and
proof, so that it has no business with markedness phenomena. But there are
also, nowadays, varieties of DEFAULT LOGIC, where a sentence A is said to
imply a sentence B by default, that is, normally, on the assumption that A
is conjoined with a set G of general statements that are normally considered
to hold. In such systems, G can be overruled, but only under special
conditions, and by means of special operations. When that happens, the
default inference is cancelled. If Burton-Roberts' argument were valid, this
would mean that the concept of a default logic was incoherent or incongruous
or whatever, because 'the effect of incorporating [a default-cancelling
operation] would be precisely to normalize [it]', and this would 'contradict
much of what [the notion of default] is supposed to account for'. In fact,
however, there are sound and fully coherent default logics, with overrule
conditions and all. Analogously, there is nothing incongruous or implausible
in natural language having an operator available for use in marked cases.
The position commonly held by those who take presupposition-cancelling
('echo') negation to be a pragmatic and not a logico-semantic phenomenon
is that the LOGICAL and/or SEMANTIC description of negation is simply the one
provided by classical logic, whereas the overlay of echo and markedness is to
be accounted for by some pragmatic theory. Such a position (though I
believe it to be mistaken) makes much better sense than what is proposed by
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Burton-Roberts, mainly because it does not have to exclude from logic or
semantics facts that are their very bread and butter, such as entailments. In
short, Burton-Roberts attributes to logic and/or to semantics powers of
' normalization' which they do not possess, while at the same time keeping
these disciplines out of their own legitimate territory. The ' normalization'
argument is nothing but not too good rhetoric.
The next, equally rhetorical, step taken by Burton-Roberts is to cast doubt
on the reliability of observations like those given in (13) above. On p. 104 we
read:
At this point it might be asked: should we not be paying attention to the
empirical (intuitive/pre-theoretical) facts of the matter by asking whether,
as a matter of brute fact, (8)-(io) [that is, cases like (13 a-c) above - PAMS]
are or are not semantically contradictory? My answer to this is that, as
native speakers, we are not very good at making such judgments directly.
Logical systems are supposed to help us in this. But in this case there are
two types of logic available... In the absence of some quite compelling
indirect evidence one way or the other, the decision is a theoretical one...
In fact, however, there is compelling indirect evidence that they are indeed
contradictory, as we shall see in the final section.
Burton-Roberts' lack of confidence here in his own powers of semantic
observation should not be taken too seriously. A little later, while in the
midst of his critique of Horn (1985), he assures his readers, with no lack of
confidence (114):
Negation is unequivocally understood as 'presupposition-preserving' in
every case except those in which that understanding is starkly impossible
- a s in (8)-(io) above- in which cases it is, again unequivocally,
understood as 'presupposition-cancelling'.
Moreover, while, as we have seen, on p. 105 trivalent systems are denied the
function of reconstructing the intuitive notion of radically false statements,
being 'purely formal systems', this function is granted them here, on p. 104.
Then, as regards the 'compelling indirect evidence' promised for the final
section, that sentence pairs like (13 a-c) are literally contradictory (or, more
precisely: contrary), I have done my best to detect that evidence, but to no
avail. I think, in fact, that no such evidence is provided at all. All we find is
the author's WISH that things should be that way (see (14c) below). And
what's more, I think that such sentence pairs are perfectly consistent. Or else
we should accuse Shakespeare of logical inconsistency when he treats us to
the following little dialogue in The Taming of the Shrew (v.i.49), where
Biondello lets his pitiless logic loose on poor Vincentio, who exclaims:
'Come hither, you rogue. What, have you forgot me?', whereupon Biondello
replies: 'Forgot you! No, Sir: I could not forget you, for I never saw you
before in all my life'.
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There is a further point, which makes it difficult for me to understand what
Burton-Roberts' actual views are. As we have seen (see note 2 above), he only
presents the ' standard' view of presupposition for the sake of his argument,
explaining elsewhere (in particular in Burton-Roberts 1989 b) what his real
position is. In (1989 b) he proposes that natural language not is NOT
presupposition-preserving. His logic there is different in that negation cancels
all contingent entailments of its argument clause. The result is that in (1989 b)
pragmatics is called upon to explain why under negation presuppositions
tend to be maintained as default assumptions (1989b: 148-150). Quite
unnecessarily, pragmatics is called on, in (1989 b), also to explain the marked,
metalinguistic character of negative sentences with presupposition can-
cellation. This would seem superfluous if the pragmatic account of default
presupposition maintenance under negation is successful. Here, however,
pragmatics is only assigned the task of explaining why and how under
negation presuppositions are sometimes cancelled. The question is: what
does Burton-Roberts actually hold? His pragmatic re-analysis of negation
(discussed in the following section) suggests a fundamental shift from what
he calls the 'revised theory of presupposition' in (1989b) back to the
'standard' notion which he rejected in (1989b). The fact that he now couples
his pragmatic re-analysis of negation to the 'higher generalization' of (i4d)
below, would seem to show that the ' standard' notion presented at the outset
was not just given 'for the purpose of the argument', but meant seriously. If
so, one would expect an explicit statement to this effect. Yet, Burton-
Roberts' writings are so baroque and verbose that it is, most of the time,
difficult, and at any rate very time-consuming, to determine what he actually
asserts. Anyway, if he has indeed reverted to the 'standard' notion of
presupposition he has saved himself at least from logical disaster, since his
(1989 b) notion is logically untenable (Seuren (to appear b)).
What is directly relevant here is Burton-Roberts' claim that logical
inconsistency does not by itself make a sentence, or a set of sentences, unfit
for actual use. The hearer will then, somehow, ignore the inconsistency and
seek a 'pragmatic', non-truth-conditional interpretation of that text. Let us
take a closer look at his pragmatic arguments as they are presented in his
Sections 3-5. First, however, we must point to the fact that, so far, he has
established nothing at all. He has failed to establish that a presuppositional
semantics is incompatible with SAN, that is with a truly trivalent logic: that
conclusion is seen to be based on a number of untenable implicit assumptions.
Nor has he established that a bivalent logic with gaps, and thus with one
unambiguous presupposition-preserving negation, is the only viable set-up
for a logico-semantic analysis of language. We are left with the fact that this
is simply how he wishes things to be. All right, provided no monopoly is
claimed; let us see what Burton-Roberts' pragmatic re-analysis amounts to.
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3. BURTON-ROBERTS' PRAGMATIC RE-ANALYSIS OF NEGATION
The gist of the proposed pragmatic re-analysis of negation is as follows.
(14) (a) Whenever a given uttered negative sentence is somehow
incongruous, for logical or other reasons, in its literal meaning
in its context, it is re-interpreted non-literally so as to make sense
in that context.
(b) Horn's (1985) cases of metalinguistic negation (MN) all have in
common that the sentences in question are somehow con-
textually incongruous in their literal meanings.
(c) Those cases presented by Horn where the negation denies a
(scalar) implicature or the appropriateness of a style or register
selection are interpreted as being LOGICALLY inconsistent in their
literal meanings.
(d) This, together with the thesis that not is unambiguous and
minimal (in a bivalent logic with gaps), permits the formulation
of a 'higher' (123) generalization to the effect that ALL of Horn's
cases of MN can now be seen to be not only cases of ' quote'
negation, that is MN, but also of logical inconsistency. In
Horn's own analysis (with classical negation in classical logic, in
other words the entailment analysis), cases like (i3a-c) are not
logically inconsistent.
(e) Hence it is preferable to take natural language not as being
MINIMAL in a bivalent logic with gaps: that makes cases of
presupposition denial, such as (I3a-c), logically inconsistent.
Let us consider these successive steps in more detail.
Step (14 a) in this argument is hard to assess. It is clearly true that logical
inconsistency of a literal meaning is sometimes overlooked or ignored in
verbal communication, to be replaced by a non-literal interpretation (see also
note 8 above). But this cannot be a reason for dispensing with logic. Indeed,
just the opposite is the case because (i) there is no reason to assume that' non-
literal ' interpretations are not subjected to the same rules of the same logic
that reigns in other forms of verbal communication, and (ii) little or nothing
is known about the CONDITIONS or the MODALITIES of non-literal in-
terpretation. As presented by Burton-Roberts, (14a) is perilously wide, and
perilously ad hoc, the latter because no reason is given for the restriction to
negative sentences when it comes to letting go of logic. One wonders, for
example, why the entailment from 'being murdered' to 'being dead' is not
cancellable on 'pragmatic' grounds in cases like (15), which remain
anomalous in any thinkable context where both sentences are asserted
successively by the same speaker:
(15) [Jonathan has been murdered. He isn't dead.
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Admittedly, (15) is a lot better, and even perhaps acceptable, if but is inserted
at the beginning of the second sentence, though some further explanation of
this glaring inconsistency is then required by any serious listener. But then
the question arises why such insertion of but is grossly inappropriate in an
example such as, (13a), which, with but, is totally unacceptable:
(16) !The king of France is NOT bald. But there is no king of France.
Causal for, or since, is much better in (16), as was demonstrated above by
Shakespeare's Biondello, but insertion of for or since in (15) leads again to
uninterpretability. It will be clear that, while possible insertion of but may be
taken as a sign that an apparent lack of consistency is being compensated for,
possible insertion of for or since points on the contrary to consistency,
whether logical or inductive or other.
Even if restricted to negative sentences, however, (14 a) remains perilously
wide, at least in terms of Burton-Roberts' analysis. For why should
pragmatic compensation in his sense be excluded in a case of sentence
negation like (17 a) but allowed in a case like (17 b):
(17) (a) ! John did not stay till the end. (For/But) he sat it all out.
(b) V John did not stay till the end. (For) he was never there.
The sentence John did not stay till the end entails that he did not sit it all out
(because that he sat it out entails that he stayed till the end), and, according
to Burton-Roberts, also that he was there. Yet in (17 b) the denial of the
entailment can be repaired (though by for and not by but), whereas in (17 a)
it cannot. The difference is that the offending entailment in (17 a) is not
presuppositional, whereas in (17 b) it is. So, if Burton-Robert's analysis is
correct, it is just presuppositional entailments of negative sentences that
allow for entailment cancellation. It would seem, at this point, that the
question of what precisely singles out presuppositional entailments for
cancellation under pragmatic protection is entirely legitimate. This question
is not answered by Burton-Roberts.
In short, while it is true that non-literal interpretation is sometimes called
for in the analysis of verbal communication, any such appeal should be
supported by at least some specification of the conditions under which this
is possible. Conversational settings require that the hearer will fall back on
any rule in the book in order to make sense of utterances he hears. But there
still is a book, with rules. And there is nothing to suggest that logic is not part
of that book, or that secondary or non-literal interpretations are not subject
to the same principles of grammatical and semantic analysis that are found
valid for literally interpreted sentences. Without any indication as to what
the boundaries are for non-literal interpretations, a claim like that made in
(14a) is relatively empty.
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Now to (14b) and (14c). The validity of these points depends on what one
takes to be the 'literal meaning' of a sentence. Take Burton-Roberts' (18):
(18) I didn't trap two mongeese. I trapped two mongooses!
It is a simple fact of linguistic observation that in its most literal interpretation
(18) expresses a double assertion about the inappropriateness of the word
mongeese as against the propriety of mongooses. I can see neither a contextual
incongruity nor a logical inconsistency here, and hence no necessity for any
kind, pragmatic or other, of re-analysis of the negation in the first sentence.
This being so, an adequate grammar of English must contain a rule
mechanism to relate the surface form of (18) with a semantic analysis
approximately like:
(19) Not [the x [such that ' / trapped two x' is properly said] is
'mongeese']; the x [such that ' / trapped two x' is properly said] is
' mongooses'
Prima facie such a rule mechanism is not implausible, given the accentual
pattern that is required for (18), with contrastive accent on mongeese and
mongooses, respectively. Contrastive accent is a sure sign of a semantically
underlying cleft form of the general structure ' the x [such that ...x...]be NP.
A rule (which I have called Predicate Lowering; Seuren, 1985: 302) lowers
the NP into the relative clause on to the position of x, deleting all higher
structure, but placing contrastive accent on the NP. Application of this rule
to (19) gives ' / trapped two mongeese' is not properly said; ' / trapped two
mongooses' is properly said. What is needed now is a rule that (optionally)
deletes 'be properly said'. But that rule is patently at work in language, not
only for what is said but, more generally, for anything done or performed.10
What else could be the analysis and the function of one's corrective
utterance: ELDERLY women you mean, after someone has just been speaking
of old womeni Under such an analysis, which corresponds directly to the way
(18) is understood, there is nothing non-literal or non-truth-conditional
about (18).n Yet the grammar is not at issue here. What is at issue is merely
the observational fact that (18) means what it means, which is expressed in
(19)-
As regards (14 d) and (14 e), we have already seen that both our intuitive
judgment and other indications, such as the insertability of for or since to
give the REASON for the presupposition denial, strongly support the view that
presupposition denials such as (i3a-c) are perfectly consistent. The 'higher'
generalization wanted by Burton-Roberts is thus entirely of his own making
and lacks factual support.
[10] Cf. Horn's amusing example of the piano teacher correcting a pupil's playing (Horn, 1985:
136), where the deletion affects 'be properly played'.
[11] Note that the analysis as given in (19) does not, as one reviewer feared it might do,
obliterate the distinction between mention and use. This is clear from the fact that in (19)
quoted elements occur as part of the analysis. What happens is that the GRAMMAR
obliterates the distinction, as it does with so many other semantic distinctions.
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This is really all that is offered by Burton-Roberts in the way of pragmatic
argumentation. He does not explain why and how not can assume precisely
the pragmatic function attributed to it: the derivation of the pragmatic from
the semantic sense remains almost totally obscure. He joins other authors,
notably Horn (1985), in saying that not, in its pragmatic sense, signals the
' rejection' of a previously uttered sentence, which is then ' sealed off' by
quotation marks and catapulted into the limbo of contextually unacceptable
sentences. I believe that this is in principle correct, at least for cases of
presupposition denial, but it does not say much as long as not even a sketch
is given of the mechanisms underlying processes of this nature.12 Moreover,
in its vagueness this intuitive analysis is also too wide, since it is clearly not
so that just any kind of utterance can be ' rejected' by the use of not. Suppose,
for' example, that you and I are discussing a certain politician, whom I think
is a crook and a hypocrite, but who in your eyes is an honest and competent
man. I say, quoting Anthony's famous words in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar:
'And Brutus is an honourable man'. You become angry with me, and want
to reject my utterance in the strongest possible way. It will be clear that you
cannot now say: 'And Brutus is NOT an honourable man!'. You might
exclaim: 'To hell with your Brutus', or something similar. But the negation
word not is unsuitable for this case. The question is: why is it unsuitable
here? Neither Burton-Roberts nor the other pragmatically inclined authors
answer questions of this kind.
It should be mentioned that Burton-Roberts presents a rather odd
argument to the effect that on the entailment analysis of presuppositions
there can be no reason why a pragmatic re-analysis of negation would be
called for anyway. We read (120):
What, on a non-presuppositional semantics, would trigger, and provide
the rationale for, a pragmatic re-analysis of the negation as metalinguistic?
The answer is: nothing whatsoever. The pragmatic re-analysis arises from
the need to solve a problem. On a non-presuppositional analysis there is
no problem...; the negation is semantically analysed as an ordinary,
straightforward, truth-functional denial.
Without wishing to defend the entailment analysis, which I think is false, I
feel that this critique is entirely without foundation. In the entailment
analysis, presuppositions are interpreted as entailments from a STRICTLY
LOGICAL point of view. But this does not mean that logic is thought to tell the
whole story. On the contrary, it is very clear from the literature (cf. Wilson,
1975, which I, oddly, seem to be defending here) that from a PRAGMATIC
point of view a presupposition is considered to have the special property of
contributing to the contextual or conversational acceptability of its carrier
sentence. This is then taken to account for the fact that the carrier sentence,
[12] For a detailed attempt at a formal and technical analysis of this notion, see Seuren (1988).
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if negated, still carries the suggestion, though not the entailment, that its
presuppositions are fulfilled, since a negative sentence should, on the whole,
be equally acceptable, in a given context or conversational setting, as its
positive counterpart. The pragmatic re-analysis of not as a metalinguistic
negation in a presupposition-denying negative sentence is thus ' triggered' by
the fact that this use of the negation stamps the whole carrier sentence as
being contextually or conversationally inappropriate. In putting the case as
he does, Burton-Roberts seriously misrepresents the position of those he
criticises.
It will be clear that his third contention, namely that his proposed
pragmatic re-analysis of not as metalinguistic negation 'itself implies a
presuppositional semantics' consisting of'a presuppositional theory of truth-
value gaps', is not supported by any kind of serious argument. There is a
certain amount of suggestive prose, or rhetoric, if you like, but no cogency.
4. THE EMPIRICAL UNTENABILITY OF BURTON-ROBERTS' POSITION
The situation is actually worse. Burton-Roberts' position not only lacks
sufficient logical, theoretical and empirical backing, as has been argued. It is
also in positive conflict with available evidence. This evidence shows that his
position, and in general the notion of a pragmatic re-analysis of negation, is
not tenable. What is required is a strictly semantic analysis of pre-
suppositional phenomena, to be flanked by a corresponding lexical and
grammatical analysis on the one hand, and a corresponding logic on the
other. Most of this evidence has been presented in Seuren (1984) and (1985);
it is presented again, and expanded, in Seuren (1988).
The gist of the evidence is a denial of the Across-the-Board Assumption
for natural language negation, which, as we have seen, is essential to both the
entailment analysis and Burton-Roberts' neo-Strawsonian position. If all
uses of not, or the corresponding negation word in other languages, were
similar in that they SUGGEST the presuppositions of the non-negative carrier
sentence while at the same time ALLOWING FOR the cancellation of this
suggestion under certain pragmatically defined conditions, it would be, I
think, very hard to argue against the entailment analysis. The crucial point
now is that this condition is not fulfilled. For many, perhaps most, uses of
negation there is indeed the suggestion that the presuppositions of the carrier
sentence hold, together with the contextually conditioned possibility of
cancellation, as was observed by the entailment analysts. But there are also
cases where, under negation, some or all of the presuppositions of a sentence
are fully preserved as entailments, without any possibility of cancellation,
and at the other end there are cases where not even the suggestion of some
or all of the original presuppositions is maintained. The cases of necessary
presupposition preservation are primary evidence against the entailment
analysis. The cases of necessary presupposition cancellation weaken the
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entailment analysis to the extent that they make it harder for a pragmatic
theory to account for the difference with the other class of presupposition-
cancelling negative sentences where the original presupposition remains in a
weakened form as a suggestion or, as I have called them elsewhere (Seuren,
to appear a), as a 'default assumption'. In so far as this evidence undermines
the entailment analysis it is new. The cases of presupposition cancellation,
with or without a remaining presuppositional suggestion, tell squarely
against Burton-Roberts' position.
Whether a negated sentence falls into the class of full logically valid
presupposition maintenance or of total cancellation, or, for that matter, of
a combination of the two (which then necessarily amounts to an ambiguity,
though with a, probably pragmatically based, preference for presupposition
maintenance), depends on the SYSTEM or TYPE PROPERTIES of that sentence,
and not on CONTINGENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF USE in specific contexts (even
though the type properties in question may consist of systematic conditions
on the sort of context in which the sentence in question can be used
intelligibly). If we accept that semantics, logic and grammar provide
descriptions and analyses on a type level, whereas pragmatic looks at the
interaction of type-level structures and token-level actual speech situations,
it follows that the distinctions in possible negation use at issue here are a
matter for semantics (with grammar and logic as indispensable companions),
and clearly not for pragmatics.
Since Burton-Roberts (121-122) badly misrepresents the evidence at issue,
making it look as though only cases with Negative Polarity Items are brought
to bear in Seuren (1984; 1985), I shall, in succinct form, present the gist of
the evidence again here. It consists mainly of pairs of positive and negative
sentences, where the negative sentence either preserves some or all of the
presuppositions of the positive sentence as full entailments that cannot be
cancelled, or cancels all these presuppositions, not even leaving the trace of
a default assumption, suggestion or implicature. Consider, for example, the
following pairs, where the negative member seems to keep the pre-
suppositions of the positive member as full, uncancellable entailments:
(20) (a) That the burglar was holding a knife frightened the cook.
(b) That the burglar was holding a knife did not frighten the cook.
(Both entail: the burglar was holding a knife.)
(21) (a) What she did was cry for help.
(b) What she did was not cry for help.
(Both entail: she did something.)
(22) (a) It was the roof that caught fire first,
(b) It wasn't the roof that caught fire first.
(Both entail: something caught fire first.)
447
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022226700014730
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Max-Planck-Institute for Psycholinguisti, on 20 Jul 2017 at 11:46:58, subject to the
PIETER A. M. SEUREN
(23) (a) The ROOF caught fire first.
(b) The ROOF didn't catch fire first.
(Both entail: something caught fire first.)
(24) (a) Only Jack was convicted.
(b) Not only Jack was convicted.
(Both entail: Jack was convicted.)13
(25) (a) All the spark plugs have been renewed.
(b) Not all the spark plugs have been renewed.
(Both entail: there were spark plugs.)
(26) (a) That lack of courage kept him from telling the truth.
(b) That lack of courage did not keep him from telling the truth.
(Both entail: he had a lack of courage.)
(27) (a) It does matter that her experiment had clear results.
(b) It does not matter that her experiment had clear results.
(Both entail: her experiment had clear results.)
(28) (a) Repeating the experiment was easy.
(b) Repeating the experiment was not easy.
(Both entail: the experiment had been done before.)14
In all these cases a presupposition of the (a)-sentence is preserved under
semantic sentence negation with no possibility of cancellation: all (b)-
sentences are clearly felt to be incompatible with the negation of the entailed
presupposition.
By way of contrast there are other cases where the presupposition is
completely neutralized. These are mostly cases where a Positive Polarity Item
(italicised in the examples) comes to stand directly under not. Only (33) is a
case where no Positive Polarity Items seems to play a role. All cases of
presupposition cancellation, whether a Positive Polarity Item is at play, as in
(29M32)> o r not> a s m (33)' carry a clear 'echo' effect (calling for a special
intonation), which means that the non-negated sentence has been explicitly
uttered or at least strongly suggested in preceding discourse, and that the
negation denies its contextual appropriateness. The non-entailment sign in
[13] As has been pointed out by Horn (1969), if only is replaced with even we also get a sentence
pair with a common entailment, namely that Jack was accused. But Not even Jack was
convicted is not the semantic negation of Even Jack was convicted. The former can only be
analysed a s ' Even Jack was not convicted', and the semantic negation of the latter can only
be expressed as something like It is not true that even Jack was convicted, due to even being
a Positive Polarity Item (see below).
[14] As one reviewer rightly noted, scalar implicatures are easily cancelled:
(i) Not all the spark plugs have been renewed - and indeed, it may turn out that none of
them have been.
(ii) Repeating the experiment was not easy - and in the end it turned out to be impossible.
This illustrates quite clearly the difference between scalar implicatures and presuppositions.
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the (b)-sentences is meant to imply, in addition, that even the suggestion of
the non-entailed sentence (the presupposition) is weakened to the point of
non-existence:15
(29) (a) They soon regretted their decision. 1= They made a decision,
(b) They did not soon regret their decision. ¥• They made a decision.
(30) (a) She staunchly supported her brother. 1= She had a brother,
(b) She did not staunchly support her brother. & She had a brother.
(31) (a) He drank some of the wine. 1= There was wine.
(b) He did not drink some of the wine. & There was wine.
(32) (a) They had plenty o/time to repeat the experiment. t= They did
the experiment before.
(b) They did not have plenty of time to repeat the experiment. V1
They did the experiment before.
Examples of this kind can be constructed at will: every language has a large
number of Positive Polarity Items, whose typical property it is precisely to
provoke an ' echo' when placed under negation, and then also to cancel all
presuppositions. In (33), exceptionally, no Positive Polarity Item seems to
occur The positive (33 a) is intended in the reading where it is entailed that
he did in fact not hurt her, not in the reading where she first turned the key
and then got hurt. Note that (33 b), though lacking a Positive Polarity Item,
still has its echo:
(33) (a) She turned the key before he had a chance to hurt her. t= There
was a key.
(b) She did not turn the key before he had a chance to hurt her. ¥•
There was a key.
No explanation is available as yet of why not behaves so differently in
different constructions. All we can do at the moment is OBSERVE that it does.
Given these observations, a pragmatic explanation seems excluded, if only
because the way the negation behaves in all such cases does not depend on
contingencies of context and/or situation but is observably there in-
dependently of any specific context. As in the case of (8) above (i.e. Sue and
David are married), we are practically forced to admit that those cases where
the negation is allowed to cancel presuppositions, as for example:
(34) The king of France is not bald.
[15] It must be noted that this does not apply to cases where the (b)-sentences are taken in the
'quote' reading, as when (29b) is said because they did so immediately. The metalinguistic
echo reading intended for the (b)-sentences is thus clearly different from their quote
reading, which is one more argument for my thesis (Seuren, 1988) that Horn's MN covers
a heterogeneous class of phenomena.
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are SEMANTICALLY and hence LOGICALLY ambiguous. This does not imply
that it is the negation word not itself that is ambiguous, though that is, of
course, a favourite hypothesis. In the same way the ambiguity of (8) does not
imply that it is the conjunction and which carries the ambiguity. (In fact, I
believe that and is not ambiguous and that the ambiguity of (8) follows from
the lexical properties of the verb marry and the fact that NP constituents are
built up grammatically from propositional structures. But this point cannot
be elaborated here.) It may be that the ambiguity of sentences like (34)
springs from other elements in the sentence than the negation word, and if
this ambiguity can be bought without the extra cost of an ambiguous
negation or of other ambiguities to be introduced just for this purpose, then,
clearly the idea of an ambiguous negation must be rejected. However, no
such alternative analysis has so far been proposed with any degree of
conviction.16
Moreover, as has been observed, for example in Seuren (1984) and (1985),
one notices that the negation that fulfils the requirement of negativity posed
by Negative Polarity Items in non-complex assertive main clauses can only
be the minimal, presupposition-preserving negation. Clearly, in most of such
cases there is no non-negative counterpart, though in some cases there is, as
in (27 a, b), where the Negative Polarity Item matter (which is at the same
time a factive verb) allows for an emphatic positive with do-support.
Consider, for example, the following sentences, where the Negative Polarity
Items are italicised:
(35) (a) She doesn't live in Paris any more. (t=she has lived in Paris
before now)
(b) She wasn't all that cruel to her dog. (t= she had a dog)
(c) He didn't as much as touch the guy. (t= there was a guy)
(d) He hasn't kicked his dog in weeks. (1= he has a dog)
Although these sentences have no direct non-negative counterpart, they
demonstrate again the exclusion of the presupposition-cancelling negation,
and thus reinforce the position that not is indeed ambiguous, as both in (11)
strengthens the view that (8) is ambiguous. Note that, in this analysis,
Negative Polarity Items require the minimal negation and exclude the radical
negation, whereas Positive Polarity Items allow for the radical negation but
exclude the minimal one. Both classes of items are thus seen to behave more
symmetrically in this than in the standard strictly bivalent analysis.
Burton-Roberts (122) presents my position as depending solely on the
obligatory minimal character of not with Negative Polarity Items. It will be
[16] Van der Sandt's 'echo operator' analysis (Van der Sandt, to appear), discussed in Seuren
(1988), is still in too weak a shape to be taken as a serious alternative.
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clear that this is, as I have said, a serious misrepresentation. He does not
make things better by going on as follows (ib):
A further compelling argument against Seuren's position on this is the fact
that negative polarity items fail to be triggered in ALL OTHER CASES of what
I and Horn wish to regard as the same phenomenon of metalinguistic
negation, including cases where what is being objected to is self-evidently
independent of the semantics, e.g. where pronunciation, morphology, or
style are being objected to. To maintain his position, Seuren must either
claim that pronunciation, morphology and style do come within the scope
of the relevant semantic operator or forego the obvious intuitive
generalization that all these negations fall together as a single phenomenon.
I have elsewhere (Seuren, 1988) commented amply on Horn's thesis that all
cases of what he (rightly) calls ' metalinguistic negation' fall naturally into
the same class. Horn, and Burton-Roberts (and a few others) are, in my view,
mistaken on this. First, cases of utterance correction, such as (cf. Burton-
Roberts 1989 b: 15):
(36) (a) Granny isn't feeling lousy, Johnny, she's badly indisposed!
(b) I'm not happy, I'm ecstatic!
(c) That car isn't old, it's antique!
(d) I didn't eat the [tVmeiDaz], I ate the [tVmaitauz]!
(e) The President hasn't lied about the letter he wrote to the
Ayatollah, he hasn't, perhaps, wished to divulge all relevant
aspects of the matter.
are precisely that: they are assertions about proper pronunciation or
adequate linguistic usage, and as such 'metalinguistic' from a logical point
of view, but just sentences from a linguistic point of view (cf. the discussion
on (18) and (19) above). And there is no reason to deny ordinary truth-
conditionality, or, for that matter, presuppositions, to such sentences. But
the presuppositions are those that come with statements about linguistic
objects, not, or not necessarily, those that come with the sentences themselves
that are quoted. Then, the negation in such cases is minimal, not radical, as
appears, for example, from the fact that (36 e), though consisting of two
negative conjuncts, still presupposes that the President sent a letter to the
Ayatollah. This class of uses of metalinguistic negation is therefore distinct
from the class of presupposition-cancelling negative sentences, such as those
presented in (29)-(32), where the negation is radical.
Moreover, contrary to Burton-Roberts' rash statement, Negative Polarity
Items do normally occur in, let us say, the Horn cases, as exemplified in
17 LIN 26
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(36a-e). Consider, for example (with the Negative Polarity Items again
italicised):
(37) (a) We aren't eating [tVmaitauz] anymore. From now on its
[tVmeiDaz] we eat.
(b) That car isn't old at all. It's antique.
This shows that Burton-Roberts' argument against Seuren's position' is not
compelling at all. It is simply based on deficient observation.
5. CONCLUSION
In summary, it doesn't seem as though Burton-Roberts has much of a case in
defending a neo-Strawsonian notion of presupposition (as, in fact, he didn't
in defending his other notion of presupposition, the one presented in his
(1989 b)). His analysis of the logical situation is (again) seen to be defective,
in particular as regards the distinction between what constitutes a truth-value
gap and what a third truth-value. His arguments for and method of
pragmatic re-analysis of negation are seen to lack substance (more so this
time than in (1989 b)). And finally, his treatment of the available data (to say
nothing of his opponents' views) lacks the care that is called for in such
matters (and this was likewise a striking feature of his (1989 b)). The upshot
is, unfortunately, that I for one, in spite of having devoted considerable time
and attention to Burton-Roberts' writings on the subject, have not been able
to see what positive contribution they have made so far to the current debate
on presuppositions.
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